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claims that his Marxism was “closer to Althus-
ser, Habermas and the Frankfurt School than 
to the Soviet Marxism of his times or of ours” 
(Bruner, 1987, p.2).
 Thus, when we speak about Vygotsky and 
Marxism we should ask what kind of Marxism 
we mean? Is it the Marxism of Marx or the 
diametrically opposed Marxisms of Althusser 
and Habermas? Perhaps we mean the Marx-
isms of Trotsky1 or even that of V. Lenin. Most 
likely we mean the Marxism in the spirit of E. 
Ilyenkov (Bakhurst, 1991, Jones, 2000; Jones, 
2001).
 Such a contradictory picture indicates a lack 
of historical perspective in approaching the 
cultural-historical theory of Vygotsky. His ap-
proach and methods changed their focus from 
refl exes in the early writings (1917-1924), 
through social behaviour (1925-1927) to the 
later works which exemplify a truly cultural-
historical approach (see Tudge, 1999, p. 11-
17). Any attempt to fi nd a cultural-historical 
theory amidst the pre-1928 writings of Vy-
gotsky would be futile. Not every thought of 
Vygotsky could be attributed to his famous 
theory, and what is more, there are some traits 
within his theory, which are mistakenly identi-
fi ed as exclusively Marxist. In uncovering the 
nature of the relation between Marxism and 
Vygotsky, we must address dramatic and even 
tragic elements.
 Vygotsky’s philosophical orientation was 
wider than Marxism. Indeed, his fi rst insights 
into the problems of the personality and human 
consciousness were philosophical rather than 
psychological. Rather than I. Pavlov or K. 
Marx it is V. Soloviev, N. Berdiaev, A. Belyi 
1   Thus, A. M. Etkind notes that in Pedagogical Psycholo-
gy “Vygotsky quoted the ideas of Lev Trotsky by pages” 
and that “in the 1991 edition, edited by V. V. Davydov, 
the quotation marks are removed from the quotation and 
the name of Lev Trotsky is left out. The authors of… 
an American monograph on Vygotsky (van der Veer & 
Valsiner, 1991), trusting Davydov, quoted this text after 
its publication as the creation of Vygotsky himself”. 
(Etkind, 1994, p. 29-30.)
and the Russian symbolists, A. Potebnya, W. 
Humboldt, W. Shakespeare, O. Mandelshtam, 
V. Shklovsky, Yu. Aikhenvald, G. Shpet, P. 
Blonsky and many others who form his social 
and cultural environment and act as partici-
pants in his scientifi c dialogues.
 Given such a background it is worth ex-
amining how Vygotsky himself explained 
the relationship between his psychology and 
Marxism. What were his thoughts on Marxist 
psychology? What were his views on these 
relations and how did these views change? 
Is it possible to fi nd in Vygotsky’s original 
texts a sort of “formula” expressing his view 
on what was Marxist psychology? In other 
words, discovering the problem of Vygotsky 
and Marxism, it obviously makes sense to take 
into account his own opinion on that matter. 
At the same time the infl uence of the ‘Silver 
Age’ of Russian culture2 on Vygotsky is also of 
interest. It is on these issues which the present 
paper concentrates.
 Vygosky’s creative evolution may be di-
vided into three periods. Each of these was 
characterised by Vygotsky’s developing ap-
proach to what is (and what is not) Marxist 
psychology. In contrast to the widespread 
discussions in the literature of the ‘classical’ 
Moscow period when the cultural-historical 
approach appeared (1928-1934), the earlier 
stages in the development of Vygotsky’s 
theoretical views are generally presented 
as being of no serious signifi cance. It thus 
makes sense to begin with this ‘pre-classical’ 
period.
2  “The Silver Age of Russian culture” is a well known 
period of Renaissance of arts and culture in the Russian 
Empire at the beginning of the 20.th century, tragically 
interrupted by the Bolsheviks in 1917. Vygotsky-the 
student was one of the most active participants of that 
cultural space. His fi rst published articles were on 
literary criticism and theatre (for more details see Van 
der Veer & Valsiner, 1991; Vygodskaya & Lifanova, 
1996).
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From refl ex to social 
behaviour: materialistic 
psychology (1917-1924)
At least three works, namely, Pedagogical Psy-
chology, Psychology of Art (written between 
1917 and 1924) and Methods of Refl exologi-
cal and Psychological Investigation (1926) are 
of importance for that period of Vygotsky’s 
theoretical evolution.
 The fi rst two of these represent the refl exo-
logical approach to the human mind. “The the-
ory of…refl exes is the basis upon which a new 
psychology must be built.” (Vygotsky, 1926b, 
p.7)3. The concept of refl ex (a modifi cation of 
I. Pavlov’s ideas which includes ‘speech re-
fl ex’) was the basic explanatory principle. The 
human mind and consciousness (thoughts and 
emotions) were viewed as a system of inhibited 
speech refl exes. In brief, Vygotsky approached 
refl exology (Pavlov’s and Behterev’s) as ma-
terialist (Marxist) psychology. Thus, human 
consciousness becomes nothing more than the 
specifi c “refl ex of refl exes” (Vygotsky, 1926b, 
p.45).
 The third important work of that period was 
his famous report, Methods of Refl exological 
Research Applied to the Study of the Psyche, 
presented at the Second All-Russian Congress 
on Psychoneurology in Petrograd in January 
1924. It was published in 1926 as an article 
entitled ‘Methods of Refl exological and Psy-
chological Investigation’ in the journal Prob-
lems of Contemporary Psychology, edited by 
K. N. Kornilov (Vygotsky, 1926a, Vygotsky, 
1994). Following this presentation, Vygotsky 
was invited by K. N. Kornilov, Director of the 
Moscow Psychological Institute, to work in 
Moscow.
 A. A. Leont’ev gives the reason for this 
important event in Vygotsky’s life in terms 
of his Marxist orientation which attracted the 
3   In this paper all translations from Russian sources are 
mine – Nikolai Veresov
attention of K. N. Kornilov. In accordance 
with the offi cial task of the young members 
of staff of the Moscow Psychological Institute 
(Leont’ev, A., 1996, p. 7), Kornilov sought to 
develop Marxist psychology. In order to clarify 
the background to these events it is worthwhile 
considering the state of Soviet psychology at 
that time.
 Those years were characterised by strenu-
ous debates and arguments concerning such 
problems as the relationship between subjec-
tive and objective methods of analysis, or be-
tween introspection and ‘extraspection’. One 
such argument pitted refl exology against psy-
chology. Debates concentrated around such 
issues as reductionism, antireductionism and 
the systemic analysis of mental phenomena. 
In his report, Vygotsky formulated his own 
theoretical position with respect to those argu-
ments. We may be sure that the appearance at 
the Petrograd Congress rostrum of an obscure 
provincial teacher was received, despite his 
striking and original report, as yet another at-
tempt to support the position of K. Kornilov 
and his followers in the struggle between the 
refl exologists and the psychologists.
 The purpose of the report was to combine 
refl exology (the objective scientifi c method 
of analysis) with psychology (the science of 
the subjective internal world of the individ-
ual) to form a single science – the objective 
psychology of consciousness. Vygotsky even 
described himself as “more of a refl exologist 
than Pavlov” (Vygotsky, 1926a, p. 42).
 In his report, Vygotsky did not touch on 
Marxism as such, but his acute criticism on the 
one hand of empirical subjective psychology 
and on the other of refl exology impressed the 
representatives of the new psychological party, 
which was searching for objective methods of 
studying consciousness. We could even say 
that it was not the Marxism in Vygotsky’s 
report and theoretical position which attracted 
the attention of Kornilov’s group; what was re-
ally original in Vygotsky’s views at that time 
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might be encapsulated by the words monism 
and materialism. In considering the possibili-
ties of creating a monistic materialistic theory 
of consciousness on the basis of refl exology 
(i.e. ‘materialistic psychology’) Vygotsky 
compared classical methods of refl exological 
analysis with classical methods of psychologi-
cal analysis and contrived to unify these two 
sciences into one based on methods of objec-
tive materialistic methods (Vygotsky, 1982, p. 
60-62).
 Summarising our brief overview of Vy-
gotsky’s position during this fi rst period, we 
note that the formula of consciousness as a 
“refl ex of refl exes” is quite far removed from 
the main ideas of cultural-historical theory. 
As for Marxism in psychology, Vygotsky was 
not the only Russian psychologist who con-
sidered refl exology as a materialist (Marx-
ist) psychology, since it was the only basis 
for creating a monistic materialistic theory of 
human consciousness. It should be mentioned, 
on the other hand, that very soon he became 
disappointed with this “formula” since, on 
his opinion, the concept of refl ex could not 
become the fundamental concept of psychol-
ogy as a concrete science of human behaviour. 
The contradiction between the objective meth-
ods of analysis of human mind Vygotsky was 
searching for, and the refl ex as basic concept, 
was the moving force forwarding Vygotsky’s 
thought to the second period of development 
of his theoretical views.
From social behaviourism 
to psychological materialism 
(1925-1927)
There are two works of Vygotsky refl ecting 
this new stage of his thoughts during the sec-
ond period from 1925 to 1927. They are Con-
sciousness as a Problem in the Psychology of 
Behaviour (1925) and A Historical Sense of 
Psychological Crisis (1927).
 As a result of various adverse technical and 
organisational circumstances, Consciousness 
as a Problem in the Psychology of Behaviour 
appeared in 1925 before the written version of 
the Petrograd report (Vygotsky, 1925; Vygot-
sky, 1979; Vygotsky, 1982, p.78-98; Vygotsky, 
1999).
 According to V. Davydov and L. 
Radzikhovskii, Vygotsky “formulated three 
programmes” in that article for the study of 
consciousness. These were (1) consciousness 
is a refl ex of refl exes, (2) consciousness is a 
question of the structure of behaviour, and (3) 
consciousness is a feature of human labour 
activity (Davydov & Radzikhovskii, 1985, p. 
45-48). Moreover, “in Vygotsky’s third pro-
gramme…consciousness emerged as an aspect 
of the structure of labour activity” and this 
programme (in contrast to the fi rst two) was 
of decisive signifi cance “relying directly on 
Marx’s ideas” (Davydov & Radzikhovskii, 
1985, p. 48).
 Let us again take a look at the text. There 
are two places in the article where Vygotsky 
borrowed directly from Marxism. Firstly, in 
speaking about Marx’s famous illustrations of 
the spider and the architect, Vygotsky noted that 
“Marx’s explanation, which is beyond dispute, 
means nothing more than a doubling of experi-
ence that is compulsory for human labour” (Vy-
gotsky, 1925, p. 183).
 Secondly, when discussing the point of in-
stinctive behaviour in animals, Vygotsky wrote, 
“The spider that weaves his web and the bee that 
builds his cell out of wax do this out of instinct, 
mechanically, always in the same way, and in 
doing so they never display any more activity 
than in any other adaptive reactions.” (Vygot-
sky, 1982, p. 84)4 This for Vygotsky was no 
more than a simple illustration of the process 
of ‘active adaptation’ in humans, which has of 
4  In the English translation of the article “adaptive reac-
tions” was translated as “adaptive activities”. (Vygotsky, 
1979, p.68).
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course nothing in common with “consciousness 
as a feature of human labour activity”.
 What are the main features of Vygotsky’s 
programme of studying consciousness? Let us 
briefl y examine the article:
1.  In contrast to his own previous views Vy-
gotsky sharply criticised even the very pos-
sibility of any refl exological explanation of 
consciousness.
“A refl ex is an abstract concept; methodologically 
it is extremely valuable, but it cannot become the 
fundamental concept of psychology as a concrete 
science of human behaviour… We should beware 
of any direct transportation of refl exological laws 
into psychology…We ought to study not refl exes, 
but behaviour, its mechanism, its component parts, 
and its structure. Actually, what we are studying in 
every case is behaviour, since we invariably organise 
beforehand, in some way or other, the behaviour of 
the subject in order to ensure that this or that reaction 
or refl ex will dominate; otherwise, we would achieve 
nothing.” (Vygotsky, 1925, pp. 179 -181).
2.  Therefore,
“…the problem of consciousness must be solved 
in psychology in a sense that consciousness is an 
interaction, refl ection, and mutual excitation of 
different systems of refl exes. What is conscious is 
what is transmitted as an irritant to other systems 
in which it has a response. Consciousness is al-
ways an echo, a response apparatus.” (Vygotsky, 
1925, p. 187.)
3.  “The individual aspect of consciousness 
is constructed as derived and secondary, 
based on the social and exactly according 
to its model.” (Vygotsky, 1925, p. 196) 
Moreover, citing here Paul Natorp (but 
not K. Marx), Vygotsky adds, “This is 
very close to the division of the individual 
person into an ‘Ego’ and an ‘Id’, which 
S. Freud analytically describes. (Vygot-
sky, 1925, p. 196) Furthermore, Vygotsky 
saw the connection between the individual 
consciousness and the social mechanisms 
of communications within the framework 
of social behaviour in terms of reversible 
refl ex. “It is extremely important here to 
establish, if only in passing, that… the 
mechanism of social behaviour and the 
mechanism of consciousness are the same. 
Speech…is a system of… refl exes of con-
sciousness, a system for refl ecting other 
systems.” (Vygotsky, 1925, p. 195.)
One can see that Vygotsky’s approach is very 
close to that of the social behaviourists: con-
sciousness is a relation between social reac-
tions according to social models.
 Thus, not three but only one scientifi c pro-
gramme of studying consciousness was pre-
sented. Moreover, there appear to be insuf-
fi cient grounds for speaking of a “programme 
of studying the consciousness as a feature 
of human labour activity” relying directly on 
Marx’s ideas5.
 Historical Sense of Psychological Crisis 
(1927) or as it is known in the West, Histori-
cal Sense of Crisis in Psychology is of great 
relevance to the topic under discussion. This 
book marks a watershed between early Vy-
gosky and the Vygotsky by the cultural-his-
torical theory. In this work (which remained 
unpublished until 1982) we could fi nd a set 
of direct considerations by Vygotsky about 
Marxist psychology. Here is the place from 
the book, which is quoted almost everywhere 
when the problem of Vygotsky’s theory and 
Marxism is discussed.
“I do not want to discover what psyche is by cutting 
out a pair of quotations. I want to learn from the 
whole of Marx’s method how to build the science, 
how to approach the investigation of the psyche.” 
(Vygotsky, 1982, p. 421.)
5  I can only explain this in such a way that Davydov and 
Radzikhovskii have access to an unknown version of 
Vygotsky’s article, which differs from both Russian 
editions as well as from the English ones.
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It seems that clear understanding of this for-
mula is possible only in the wider context 
of Vygotsky’s considerations, presented in 
the text. Let us try to restore that context in 
brief.
 He recalls how he had once been struck 
by a question asked by a certain Western sci-
entist. The question was “What psychology 
do you study in Russia? Your being Marxists 
does not explain yet what sort of psychologists 
you are. Knowing the popularity of Freud in 
Russia, I fi rst thought of the Adlerians; they 
are also Marxists, but you have quite a dif-
ferent psychology, haven’t you? We are So-
cial Democrats and Marxists too, but we are 
also Darwinists and Copernicans.” (Vygotsky, 
1982, p. 434.)
That conversation gave Vygotsky food for 
thought and for arguments against the term 
‘Marxist psychology’.
• Firstly, just as the theory of Darwin forms 
a part of biology and that of Copernicus a 
part of astronomy, there must be a concrete 
theory to determine the inner structure of 
psychology. “A Marxist historian would 
never refer to ‘a Marxist history of Russia’. 
He would assume that the thing was clear 
of itself since it is synonymous with ‘true 
or scientifi c’.” (Vygotsky, 1982, p. 434.) 
Thus, to merely state that scientists in the 
Soviet Union studied Marxist psychology 
would be to evade the issue.
• Secondly, Vygotsky had another argument 
against the term ‘Marxist psychology’: 
“Marxist psychology is not a school among 
schools but the only true psychology as a 
science. There can be no other psychology 
but this one”. (Vygotsky, 1982, p. 435.)
For Vygotsky the term ‘Marxist psychology’ 
“coincided with that of scientifi c psychology 
in general wherever and by whomsoever it 
might be developed” (Vygotsky, 1982, p. 435). 
This might be the formula, probably the key 
formula, expressing Vygotsky’s understanding 
of what is Marxist psychology.
 Vygotsky rejected the way of building 
Marxist psychology by taking certain formu-
lae of dialectical laws from philosophy and 
explaining psychological processes and their 
laws in terms of concrete manifestations of 
the universal laws of dialectic. On this point 
he criticised K. Kornilov who was one of the 
scientifi c leaders of Marxist psychology in 
1920s.
 Firstly, Kornilov’s approach to the creation 
of Marxist psychology “in the light of dialecti-
cal materialism” was quite typical for that time. 
To understand the nature of consciousness was 
to explain it in accordance with materialism 
and dialectic. The main idea was to explain 
the ‘dialectical’ nature of psychical processes 
and laws by presenting them as examples of 
fundamental and universal philosophical laws 
such as the law of the mutual penetration of 
opposites, the law of the transformation of 
quantity into quality and the law of the nega-
tion of negation. In particular, the changes 
in perception of fi gures described in Gestalt 
theory were explained in accordance with the 
law of transformation of quantity into quality 
(Kornilov, 1930, p. 255).
So,
“immediate application of the theory of dialectical 
materialism to the problems of natural science, in 
particular to biology and psychology, is impossible 
as it is impossible to apply it immediately to history 
or sociology. Like history, sociology requires the 
special mediating theory of historical materialism, 
which explains the particular signifi cance of the 
abstract laws of dialectical materialism for a par-
ticular group of phenomena. Similarly, a theory of 
biological materialism, or psychological material-
ism, as a mediating science explicating the concrete 
application of the abstract tenets of dialectical ma-
terialism to a particular domain of phenomena, is 
indispensable.” (Vygotsky, 1982, p. 419-420.)
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The problem of Marxism and psychology, Vy-
gotsky argued, is much more complex than the 
mere construction of psychology in accordance 
with Marxism. Psychology needs a certain 
methodology-theory (meta-theory) of its own 
but not one taken strictly from philosophy. For 
political economy, history and sociology such 
a mediated meta-theory (historical material-
ism) was devised by K. Marx in Capital.
 In this sense psychology needs its own Cap-
ital. In this (and only in this particular but prin-
cipal) context Vygotsky argues: “In order to 
create such enabling theories – methodologies 
in general sciences – it is necessary to discover 
the essence of the given area of phenomena, 
the laws of their changes, their qualitative and 
quantitative characteristics, their causality; to 
create the categories and concepts relevant to 
them – in other words, to create one’s own 
Capital.” (Vygotsky, 1982, p. 420.)
 According to Vygotsky, the idea is not to 
impose the dialectical principles on nature but 
to fi nd them there. Similarly, as Capital was 
not the application of dialectical materialism to 
the problems of political economy and society, 
the future Capital in psychology was seen only 
as the possibility of expressing and describ-
ing its own objects and their laws but not as 
the application of dialectical materialism. Con-
sequently, the categories, concepts and laws 
in this Capital must be psychological but not 
philosophical ones (Vygotsky, 1982, p. 420).
 The conclusion of the work comes across 
rather like a verdict:
“Ultimately, there is no Marxist psychology as 
yet. This must be seen as a historical task, not as 
something given. But in the present state of affairs 
it is diffi cult to avoid the impression that there is 
a considerable lack of scientifi c seriousness and 
responsibility surrounding this appellation.” (Vy-
gotsky, 1982, p. 433)
Bearing this in mind let us now turn to the fi nal 
period of Vygotsky’s work (1927-1934) and 
his famous cultural-historical theory.
Cultural-historical theory 
(1927-1934): true Marxist 
psychology?
A survey of the literature on the subject dem-
onstrates quite clearly that at least three ideas 
from the cultural-historical theory may be 
viewed as Marxist. These are (1) the role of 
human activity (practice) in mental develop-
ment, (2) social origins of mind and (3) cultural 
signs/symbols as ‘psychological tools’. But do 
we have enough evidence for the assertion that 
these ideas are exclusively Marxist? Before 
coming to this point let us change the angle 
of analysis.
General genetic law of development – 
Marxist roots?
As classical physics is based on Newtonian 
laws, the theory of Vygotsky is based on a 
law, called “the general genetic law of cultural 
development”. It seems to be clear that if we 
do not understand (or just misunderstand) the 
general law, we could hardly understand the 
whole theory based on this law. We can as-
sume that clear understanding of the general 
law might bring a new light how cultural-
historical theory is connected with Marxist 
philosophy. Is the  general law connected with 
a Marxist approach, or maybe there are some 
other roots of it?
 Here is the formulation of the general ge-
netic law of cultural development as it was 
presented in Vygotsky’s original text
“…any function in the child’s cultural development 
appears on stage twice, that is, on two planes. It 
fi rstly appears on the social plane and then on a 
psychological plane. Firstly among people as an 
inter-psychological category and then within the 
child as an intra-psychological category. This is 
equally true with regard to voluntary attention, 
logical memory, the formation of concepts and 
the development of volition.” (Vygotsky, 1983, 
p.145.)
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It is curious that in the literature, which West-
ern readers work with, there is a slightly dif-
ferent formulation.
 This comes from the Mind in Society of 
1978.
“…every function in the child’s…development ap-
pears twice: fi rst, on the social level, and later, on 
the individual level; fi rst between people (interpsy-
chological), and then inside the child (intrapsycho-
logical)… (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 57)
This formulation was quoted and repeated so 
many times that it gradually obtained the sta-
tus of a classical formulation for generations 
of researchers.
 The other interpretation belongs to Vasilii 
Davydov.
Every function “appears…twice, fi rstly as collec-
tive, social activity (kollektivnaya, sotsial’naya dey-
atelnost) and then as individual activity (deyatelnost 
individualnaya)” (Davydov, 1996, p. 24)
At a fi rst glance, despite slight differences 
these two interpretations look more or less 
similar and correspond to Vygotsky’s formula-
tion. They both emphasise the most important 
aspect – the social origins of mind, as fun-
damental in Vygotsky’s approach to human 
development. Even more, giving such an inter-
pretation, V. Davydov directly says that here 
is the central point that connects Vygotsky’s 
approach to the Marxist tradition (Davydov, 
1996, p. 24). We will come to the term “ac-
tivity” in Vygotsky’s theory later, but now let 
us ask whether another interpretation of the 
general genetic law is possible?
 To fi nd the answer, to understand Vygot-
sky’s formulation of the law, to identify its 
every word, it is needed to know the language 
the formulation was written in.
 Let us try to make a step to such kind of 
identifi cation.
 According to Vygotsky, every function ap-
pears fi rstly on the social plane, among people. 
But the crucial point is that the function 
DOES NOT and cannot appear IN the social 
relations.
“…every higher mental function, before becoming 
internal mental function, previously was a social 
relation between two people”. “All mental func-
tions are internalized social relations” (Vygotsky, 
1983, p.145 -146).
So, before becoming individual function, it 
was not in a social relation, it was a social re-
lation itself. Social relation is not the “area”, 
not the fi eld, and not the “level” where mental 
function appears, – the social relation itself 
becomes child’s individual function – herein 
lies the answer.
 If every higher mental function was a so-
cial relation between two people, does it mean 
that every social relation can become a mental 
function? Defi nitely not! Nevertheless, in Vy-
gotsky’s formulation we can fi nd a clear notion 
of what type or relation can become a mental 
function. The point is that to understand it we 
have to turn to the language of Russian culture 
of the beginning of the 20.th century. We have 
to recall that Vygotsky came to psychology 
from the area of humanities and culture. He 
belongs to the generation of “The Silver Age 
of Russian culture”. Theatre, poetry, arts, lit-
erature of that period had a language of their 
own which was almost totally lost after the 
Revolution.
 In our context I mean particularly the word 
“category” Vygotsky uses in the formulation. 
What does the word “category” actually mean? 
From the times of Aristotle, especially in Ger-
man classical philosophy, the category is the 
most abstract, the most general concept (Spirit 
and Matter are examples of categories). It 
sounds strange therefore that the mental func-
tion appears twice, fi rst as inter-psychologi-
cal category, and then as intra-psychological 
category. Maybe it is just a sort of metaphor, 
which can be easily omitted in translation?
 Not at all! On the contrary, the word “cat-
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egory” (which is repeated twice in the formula-
tion of the general law) has defi nite meaning. 
In Russian pre-revolutionary theatre’s vocabu-
lary, the word category meant “dramatic event, 
collision of characters on the stage”. Vsevolod 
Meierhold (famous Russian theatre director) 
wrote that category is the event, which creates 
the whole drama (Meierhold, 1920). Sergey 
Eisenstein, the famous fi lm director wrote: 
“Category is a unit of drama”. Vygotsky was 
familiar with the language of Russian theatre 
and arts and had to use the word “category” to 
emphasize the character of the social relation, 
which was to become the individual function. 
The social relation he means is not an ordinary 
social relation between two individuals. This 
is a social relation that appears as a category, 
i. e. as emotionally coloured and experiencing 
collision, a contradiction between two people, 
the dramatical event, a drama between two 
individuals. Being emotionally and mentally 
experienced as social drama (on the social 
plane) it later becomes an individual intra-
psychological category.
 Probably the best (and familiar to every-
body) example here might be the case of de-
bate between the two people. Imagine (or just 
remember) that one day you met a friend and 
had a debate, expressing opposite positions. 
Dramatical collision in a debate, experienced 
by the both participants, can lead to a sort of 
self-refl ection. In the course of time, (for ex-
ample next morning) one of the participants 
remembers the event and what he has done 
and said. It could happen like «I was wrong 
saying that, I made a mistake…I should not 
say such sharp words…I was so aggressive 
and did not pay enough attention to what he 
tried to say…How stupid I was yesterday…”
 We see here that the individual now expe-
riences the same category, intra-psychologi-
cally. In this type of internal category, all the 
mental functions of the individual are involved 
(memory – “I said something rough”, emo-
tions – “How stupid my behaviour was, what 
a shame”, thinking – “I have to think it over 
and never repeat such bad things”, volition – “I 
must stop it, I will never forget what I have 
done. I promise myself to be patient…”
 Such emotionally experienced collision 
brings radical changes to the individual’s mind, 
and therefore it is a sort of act of development 
of mental functions – the individual becomes 
different, he becomes higher and above his 
own behaviour. Without internal drama, an 
internal category, such kind of mental changes 
are hardly possible6.
 This consideration about the dramatical 
character of development, refl ected in the word 
“category”, brings the following question: are 
there any other words and terms in Vygot-
sky’s formulation, which are also of primary 
importance?
 It seems that words “on the stage” and “on 
two planes” are not metaphors, which might 
be omitted or ignored. Scientifi c formula of 
the general law of the theory is not a good 
place for any kind of metaphors. Stage in 
Russian means “scene”, the arena, literally 
the place in the theatre where actors play. 
Scene has two planes – the front plane (also 
called “the fi rst plane”) and the back plane 
(often called “the second plane7”). According 
to theatre’s traditions, main events of a per-
formance should happen on the front plane 
of the scene (the same law we could fi nd in 
visual arts). So, it means that on the stage of 
our development, the category appears twice 
– inter-psychologically (on the fi rst, front 
plane) and then intra-psychologically (on the 
second internal individual plane). Therefore, 
there are no two levels in development, but 
6   In another place of the same text, Vygotsky uses the 
word “drama” directly. “From here comes, that one of 
the central principles of our work is the experimen-
tal unfolding of higher mental process into the drama 
which happened between the people” (Vygotsky, 1983, 
p.145)
7   I could compare this with “the role of second plane” in 
contemporary cinema.
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there are two planes on ONE stage, two di-
mensions of one event.
 All this gives some grounds to assert that 
discovering the cultural-philosophical roots of 
cultural-historical theory, we should keep in 
mind that they were not limited to Marxism – 
the language of Russian cultural-philosophical 
tradition was the language Vygotsky perfectly 
spoke. This link with Russian philosophy, cul-
ture and arts should not be underestimated.
 With this in mind, let us turn to the above-
mentioned ideas from the cultural-historical 
theory often seen as Marxist: (1) the role of 
human activity (practice) in mental develop-
ment, (2) social origins of mind and (3) cultural 
signs/symbols as ‘psychological tools’.
Human activity and development
The prevailing opinion in modern literature is 
that Vygotsky’s assertion of the role of human 
activity was in some sense similar to Marx’s 
well-known First Thesis on Feuerbach. A. N. 
Leont’ev noted:
“The importance of this category [the category of 
activity] hardly needs to be emphasised. We need 
only recall Marx’s famous thesis on Feuerbach, in 
which he said that the chief defect of earlier meta-
physical materialism was that it viewed sensuous-
ness only as a form of contemplation, not as human 
activity or practice….” (Leont’ev, 1981, p. 41.)
This is closely connected with the long tradi-
tion of presenting the relations between the 
two theories, i.e. the cultural-historical and 
the psychological theories of activity. Soviet 
representatives of this approach look at these 
theories as two historical and theoretical stages 
in the development of Marxist psychology 
(see, for example, Davydov & Radzikhovskii, 
1985; Davydov & Zinchenko, 1989). The main 
point of the discussion is the role and status of 
the concept of ‘activity’ in Vygotsky’s theory 
and the theory of activity (for more details see 
Jensen, 1999; Tolman, 2001; Lektorsky, 1999; 
Tulviste, 1999).
What does ‘activity’ mean?
The English term activity has two Russian 
equivalents. The fi rst is aktivnost and the sec-
ond deyatelnost. Aktivnost traditionally refers 
to processes in the organism or to an active 
state (in contrast to a passive one). In German 
aktivnost is rendered by Aktivitat. Deyatelnost 
is a term referring to the practical, socially or-
ganised, object-related, goal-directed activity 
of an individual (for example, labour activity 
is trudovaya deyatelnost). In German deyatel-
nost is Tätigkeit.
 Moreover (and this complicates the situa-
tion), very often deyatelnost is used in a sense 
of aktivnost (for example ‘brain activity’ is 
‘deyatelnost mozga’, or ‘higher nervous ac-
tivity’ is ‘visshaya nervnaya deyatelnost’). In 
such cases deyatelnost has nothing to do with 
Tätigkeit.
 Very often, however, and especially in 
translations of Vygotsky, these two terms are 
translated into English by the same word, ac-
tivity, in spite of differences of meaning in-
tended. This leads to numerous mistakes and 
misunderstandings, particularly amongst those 
who work with English translations of Vygot-
sky’s works.
 According to the theory of A. N. Leont’ev 
the term deyatel’nost as the central category 
(Leont’ev, 1974-1975, 1978, 1981) has an 
absolutely defi nite and concrete meaning. 
For example, he wrote, “It is our position 
that the proper way for psychology…is to 
introduce the category of object-type activity 
(gegenständliche Tätigkeit)…We are speak-
ing here about activity, not about behaviour 
or the processes of nervous physiology…” 
(Leont’ev, 1974-1975, p. 9.) According to 
Leont’ev, the term Tätigkeit (deyatel’nost) 
should be used in contrast to Aktivität 
(Leont’ev, 1974-1975, p. 6; Leont’ev, 1977, 
p. 75).
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 As for Vygotsky, our analysis shows8 that 
in all of his texts between 1924 and 1927 the 
term deyatelnost was used not in the sense of 
Tätigkeit but in that of Aktivität, in line with 
typical and traditional usage in the physiology 
and psychology of the time. Vygotsky used 
this term in the same sense as Ivan Pavlov 
(higher neural activity – vysshaya nervnaya 
deyatelnost), Vladimir Bekhterev (correlative 
activity) and Charles Sherrington (the activity 
of nervous centres). In any case I could not fi nd 
in the early texts of Vygotsky the term ‘activ-
ity’ used in the sense of Tätigkeit. This means 
that the widely held view that the origins of 
this concept may be found in the early writings 
of Vygotsky (Kozulin, 1996; Nardi, 1996) can 
no longer be considered beyond dispute.
 As for the writings after 19279 the situation 
looks different. Developing his cultural-his-
torical theory, Vygotsky wrote in some cases 
about activity in the sense of Tätigkeit. Sum-
marising the analysis of the texts, we may 
formulate three main contexts for the use of 
this term by Vygotsky: 
1. In the article ‘Play and its role in the men-
tal development of the child’ (Vygotsky, 
1966/1933) he states that play is a leading 
activity in early childhood. Later on in 
the mid 1930s this notion was developed 
and transformed by A.N. Leont’ev and his 
collaborators into the concept of leading 
activity. As for Vygotsky, he did not for-
8   Me made this analysis on the basis of Vygotsky’s com-
plete bibliography made by T. Lifanova (Vygodskaya 
& Lifanova, 1996, p. 390-418)
9   We focused our text analysis on the Lifanova’s list with 
special emphasis to “The problem of the Cultural De-
velopment of the Child” (1928), “The History of the De-
velopment of the Higher mental functions” (1983), “The 
Development of Higher Psychological Functions” (1960, 
1977, 1981), “The Instrumental Method in Psychology” 
(1981), “Concrete Human Psychology” (1989), “Tool 
and the Sign in a Child’s Development (1960), and, of 
course, in his Magnus Opus “Thinking and Speech” 
(1934, 1962, 1986).
mulate this as a concept, but undoubtedly 
established preconditions for it.
In contrast, there are numerous places in his 
works where speech and communication are 
presented as formative sources of the human 
mind.
 Vygotsky claimed that “…speech plays an 
essential role in the organisation of higher men-
tal functions.” (Vygotsky, 1978, p.23). Later 
he improved the position, saying that “speech, 
being initially the means of communication, 
the means of association, the means of organi-
zation of group behaviour, later becomes the 
basic means of thinking and of all higher men-
tal functions, the basic means of personality 
formation…” (Vygotsky, 1998, p. 169). As we 
can see this position is directly connected with 
the formulation of the “general genetic law of 
cultural development” discussed above.
2.  There is also another place where Vygot-
sky speaks about the role of activity in the 
development of human mental functions. 
In the article of 1930 he discussed the par-
ticular problem of the role of labour activ-
ity in the process of the child’s intellectual 
development, that is, the development of 
intelligence (Vygotsky, 1930; Vygotsky, 
1976). Even the most careful reader of this 
article will fi nd nothing about “activity as 
the substance of human consciousness”. On 
the contrary there are a number of places 
where Vygotsky emphasises that despite the 
connection between labour activity and the 
development of intelligence (umstvennoe 
razvitie), consciousness is not reducible to 
it. Labour activity was seen as just one fac-
tor of development rather than the source.
It seems, therefore, that we do not have suffi -
cient grounds for the assertion that the concept 
of activity (deyatelnost, Tätigkeit) played an 
essential role in his cultural-historical theory.
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It should be also added that by the end of the 
1930s, Vygotsky’s theory was under attack 
from A.N. Leont’ev and his Kharkov group 
because of its lack of recognition of activity 
as the substance of the human mind, i.e. its 
non-Marxist character. For example, in the 
article of 1939 P. I. Zinchenko, closest associ-
ate of Leont’ev, drew a sharp contrast between 
the “idealistic non-Marxist communication-
based conception of Vygotsky” and the “ma-
terialistic Marxist activity-based conception 
of Leont’ev” (Zinchenko, 1939/1983-1984). 
In particular, he claimed that
“Vygotsky’s fundamental error is..[that] he miscon-
strued the Marxist conception of the historical and 
social determination of the human mind. Vygotsky 
understood the Marxist perspective idealistically…
The source of mental development was thought to 
be communication of the subject’s mind with the 
cultural, ideal reality rather than his actual relation-
ship to reality.” (Zinchenko, 1983-1984, p. 66)
Moreover, Vygotsky’s mistake
“impeded any understanding of the true, concrete, 
psychological source of the origin and development 
of…mental activity…This led Vygotsky to the idea 
of communication as the source and prime mover 
of the development of the child’s consciousness, 
to an idealistic understanding of communication 
in terms of ‘spiritual intercourse’, as speech com-
munication rather than as the mutual relations of 
people with one another, relations that include their 
‘material intercourse’ (Marx).” (Zinchenko, 1983-
1984, p. 71)
This does not mean that P.I. Zinchenko mis-
understood Vygotsky’s approach. Rather it 
indicates that in 1930s nobody suspected, that 
cultural-historical theory might have anything 
to do with the concept of activity as the source 
of the development of the human mind.
Social origins of mind
Undoubtedly the social origin of mind is one 
of the distinguishing features of Vygotsky’s 
approach. It was fi rst formulated in his early 
writings as follows: “Our personality is or-
ganised according to the same model as social 
communication.” (Vygotsky, 1926a, p. 178).
 As for the writings of 1927-1934, in its 
full form this idea was presented in the begin-
ning of the 1930s in Development of Higher 
Psychological Functions (Vygotsky, 1960, p. 
13-223, Vygotsky, 1981); “everything internal 
in higher forms was external…When we speak 
of a process, ‘external’ means ‘social’. Any 
higher mental function was external because 
it was social.” (Vygotsky, 1981, p. 162.) What 
was really new in Vygotsky’s formulation was 
that the social world was seen not as a factor 
of development but as the source of the human 
mind.
 This formulation coincides with the famous 
thesis by Marx: “It is not the consciousness of 
men that determines their existence but, on the 
contrary, their social existence that determines 
their consciousness.” (Marx,1859)
 But does this mean that it must be identi-
fi ed as a Marxist trait in Vygotsky’s theory? 
Did Vygotsky himself considered his formula 
to occupy the Marxist position? There is some 
evidence for that. Thus, he wrote:
“To paraphrase a well-known position of Marx’s, 
we could say that the psychological nature of hu-
mans represents the aggregate of internalised so-
cial relations that have become functions for the 
individual and forms of his/her structure… All 
higher mental functions are internalised social re-
lationships… We do not want to say that this is 
the meaning of Marx’s position but we see in this 
position the fullest expression of that toward which 
the history of cultural development leads us.…” 
(Vygotsky, 1981, p. 164-165).
It should be pointed out that the idea of the 
social origins of mind is not originally Marx-
ist. In particular, Wilhelm Wundt propounded 
the notion that higher psychological processes 
could only be investigated through a histori-
cal study of cultural products such as tales, 
language and cultural customs. G. H. Mead, 
J. Dewey, E. Durkheim, E. Cassirer and many 
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others proceeded from the assumption that the 
nature of human consciousness is determined 
by sociocultural factors (see, for instance, 
Cole, 1995, p. 5; Maffi olo, 1993; Netchine-
Grynberg, 1995). In any case, to paraphrase 
Marx’s Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach does not 
mean to construct ‘Marxist psychology’.
 Moreover, if we take a look at this position 
from the perspective of a “general genetic law 
of development”, we could fi nd some grounds 
for the assertion that the idea of the social 
origins of the mind had deeper (even hidden) 
roots in the philosophy of “The Silver Age of 
Russian culture”.
 We have biographical data to confi rm 
that during his university years (1913-1916) 
Vygotsky attended lectures by G. G. Shpet 
(1879-1937) and participated in his seminars 
on ‘ethnic psychology’. It is remarkable that 
the question of the infl uence of the ideas of 
Gustav Shpet or on a wider scale of Russian 
idealist philosophy on Vygotsky was not de-
bated in Soviet literature. Resent Russian 
sources on this theme are presented by works 
of Martsinkovskaya (Martsinkovskaya, 1999) 
and Zinchenko (Zinchenko, 2003). I could add 
to this at least two important points.
 For political and ideological reasons, Vy-
gotsky was not able to even mention the name 
of Shpet, but he defi nitely was acquainted with 
his concept. Firstly, in his ‘ethnic’ psychol-
ogy G. Shpet defended the notion of objective 
meaning, independent of the individual, and of 
ideas realised in history. However, he pointed 
out that the psychological aspect is made pat-
ent precisely in the act of their being realised 
by empirical subjects. He presented the idea 
of combining the individual senses and social 
meanings into a single structure. “A cultural 
phenomenon such as the expression of sense 
is objective but in it, within this expression, 
there is also a conscious…attitude toward this 
‘sense’ and it is this attitude that is the subject 
matter of psychology. Not sense, not meaning, 
but co-meaning accompanying the realisation 
of the historical, the subjective responses and 
experiences, and attitude toward it, are the 
subject matter of psychology.” (Shpet, 1989, 
p. 11). Let us compare this now with the Vy-
gotskian thesis:
“Initial forms of affective-semantic formations (af-
fektivno-smislovie obrazovaniya) of human con-
sciousness exist objectively outside of the separate 
person, they exist in human society as products of 
arts…. i.e. these forms exist earlier than individual 
or subjective affective-semantic formations.” (Vy-
gotsky, 1991, p.211)
Later Vygotsky proposed that meaning be re-
garded as a structural component of the unit of 
analysis of the mind. Furthermore, Vygotsky 
considered that the nature of meaning is social, 
that meaning is really co-meaning, that is, gen-
eralised social relations within the culture.
 Secondly, in his psychological theory 
Shpet defi ned two types of environment – 
the natural and the spiritual. “There are two 
directions in which the experiences of the 
single consciousness move through its own 
causality – the natural environment and the 
spiritual one.” (Shpet, 1989, p. 508) Accord-
ing to Shpet, neither materialistic no intel-
lectualistic psychology is able to describe the 
nature of relations and the attitude of individ-
ual consciousness and the spiritual environ-
ment (Ibid.). This idea is remarkable from the 
methodological point of view since the notion 
of psychological dualism and the limitations 
of one-sided approaches in psychology were 
much criticised by Vygotsky in his Methods 
of Refl exological and Psychological Investi-
gation (1926) and later in Historical Sense of 
Psychological Crisis.
 We may add than the cultural-historical 
theory of the development of higher mental 
functions worked out by Vygotsky in 1927-
1928 was an attempt to overcome the tradi-
tional dualism in the psychological explanation 
of the mind. Instead, it chose as its basis mon-
istic explanations of the relations between the 
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man and his cultural environment. It is worth 
remembering that Vygotsky used the idea of 
cultural environment and also the concept of 
two types of development as one of the basic 
foundations of his theory of human conscious-
ness. Of course, the infl uence of Shpet was not 
a direct or strict one. However, it demonstrates 
that Vygotsky was not a ‘lone thinker’. He was 
a child of the intellectual and cultural environ-
ment of his time which included more than just 
the philosophy of Marxism and naturalistic 
psychology.
Sign mediation and ‘psychological tools’
Tools of labour, psychological tools and sym-
bolic mediation are widely discussed as Marx-
ist themes in Vygotsky’s approach (see, for 
example, extended discussions on this in Jones, 
2000, and Zinchenko, 1995).
 For the purposes of the present article it 
makes sense to formulate this conception in 
the following terms.
 Firstly, higher mental functions are medi-
ated by cultural tools. Accordingly, “…the 
central fact of our psychology is that of media-
tion.” (Vygotsky, 1982, 166)
 Secondly, according to Vygotsky this type 
of organisation is basic to all higher mental 
functions. The use of signs leads humans to 
a completely new and specifi c structure of 
behaviour, breaking away from the traditions 
of biological development and creating a new 
form of a culturally based mental functions 
(Vygotsky, 1978, p. 40.).
 Finally, discussing the problem in The De-
velopment of Higher Psychological Functions, 
written in the late 1920s, Vygotsky claims that 
the sign acts as an instrument of psychological 
activity (aktivnost in the original Russian text 
– N. V.), “…in a manner analogous to the role 
of a tool in labour.” (Vygotsky, 1977, p. 69) 
This seems to be very close to the Marxist idea 
of the role of tools of labour in the development 
of human beings.
 But the point to emphasise is that the whole 
picture is deeper and more complicated and 
requires more careful analysis.
Signs, tools of labour and mediation
Claiming that the use of cultural signs is analo-
gous to the use of tools, Vygotsky stresses that 
in spite of the similarity between and common 
features shared by these two forms of activity, 
there are some essential differences (Vygotsky, 
1977, p. 69).
 “The most fundamental difference between 
sign and tool is the manner of their orientation. 
The function of the tool is to serve as a conduc-
tor of human infl uence on the object of activity 
(deyatelnost – N.V.). It is externally oriented; it 
must exert an effect on its object. It is a means 
of performing external activity (deyatelnost) 
aimed at mastery over nature. By contrast, the 
sign changes nothing in the object of the psy-
chological operation. It is a means of exerting 
psychological infl uence on behaviour, be it 
one’s own behaviour or that of another. It is a 
means of performing internal activity directed 
at mastery over oneself; the sign is internally 
directed…”(Vygotsky, 1982,Vol.3, p.90).
 Developing this point in Tool and Sign 
prepared in 1930 (and mistakenly translated 
as ‘Tool and Symbol’ – see Vygotsky, 1978, 
p.ix), he mentions that the sign is, fi rstly, a 
means towards social contact, a way of ex-
erting infl uence on others. Only later does it 
appear as a means of infl uencing oneself (Vy-
gotsky, 1982,Vol.3, p.144).
 In other words, for Vygotsky the sign is 
not like tool of labour (just as an analogue 
is not a synonym!). A cultural sign (for ex-
ample, a word, gesture or even a traffi c sign) 
makes sense in its being directed towards other 
people. A sign is a means for conducting so-
cial relations (in the form of communication), 
including the wide social context of commu-
nication. The concrete social relations within 
which the child participates in communication 
are the source of the human mind (including 
volitional-emotional components). In other 
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words, sign as a psychological tool originates 
in the social situation of development. Moreo-
ver, internal activity (sign-mediated mental 
functions, originally social ones) is essentially 
different from object-oriented activity (medi-
ated by tools of labour) and is not derivative 
from it. External (object-related) and internal 
(mental) activities are essentially different be-
cause of the different means of organisation 
and different types of mediation involved.
“These activities are so different from one another 
that the nature of the means employed in each 
case cannot be same.” (Vygotsky, 1982,Vol.3, 
p.90)
My second thesis concerning the subject under 
discussion is that the view of cultural signs 
as psychological tools and as the organ of an 
individual was widely discussed in Russian 
non-Marxist philosophy at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. O. Mandelshtam (Russian 
poet and friend of Vygotsky), G. Shpet (pupil 
of Husserl), Viacheslav Ivanov (one of the 
fathers of Russian symbolism), P. Florensky, 
A. Losev and many others wrote extensively 
on this theme.
 Thus, according to Pitirim Sorokin “…the 
sign environment forms different types of be-
haviour” (Sorokin, 1920, p.184-185). In claim-
ing that the use of signs leads humans to a com-
pletely new and specifi c structure of behaviour 
and the creation of new forms of culturally 
based mental function, was Vygotsky closer 
to Marx than to non-Marxist P. Sorokin? At 
the same time, in claiming that the cultural 
sign is a means of social communication, was 
Vygotsky closer to P. Sorokin (who wrote that 
“connection of the individuals with the same 
symbols connects them to each other”) than to 
Marx? (Ibid, p. 323).
 In distinguishing between two types of sig-
nals in terms of natural and social (signs) was 
Vygotsky closer to Marx than to G. Shpet?10. 
Finally, when speaking of the role of the word 
as a tool of mind was Vygotsky referring to the 
famous thesis of Marx or was he just repeating 
the position of P. Florensky who wrote that the 
word is amphibian, a mediator between inner and 
 external realities (Florensky, 1990, p. 280)11?
Some fi nal remarks
Discussing the problem of Marxist and non-
Marxist aspects of the cultural-historical psy-
chology of L. S. Vygotsky we should take 
into consideration at least two important 
circumstances.
1.  It was not only Marxism which infl uenced 
Vygotsky. He was a child of the Silver 
Age of Russian culture and philosophy 
and the infl uence of this should not be 
underestimated. He tried to fi nd answers 
to the questions concerning issues such 
as the individual and the world, person-
ality and consciousness, mind and body, 
thought and speech, culture and nature, in 
other words, the same issues which had 
tormented contemporary Russian writers, 
poets and philosophers.
Consequently, some traits in Vygotsky’s the-
ory, traditionally considered Marxist – such 
as the concept of the social origins of mind or 
sign as psychological tool – also might have 
deeper and wider roots in the works of Shpet, 
Florensky, Blonsky, Sorokin and Meierhold. 
For political and ideological reasons Vygotsky 
was not able to even mention some of these 
names during Soviet times. Yet in his writings 
one can hear these ‘voices of culture’, often 
indirectly but unmistakably.
10   In his book of 1920, G. Shpet formulates in the following 
way: “There are two categories of symbols…natural and 
social” (Shpet, 1990, p. 428).
11  I could give more details on the connections of Vygotsky 
and the Russian philosophical tradition, but because of 
lack of space see Veresov, 2000.
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2.  As for Marxism as such, it was not some-
thing like a “holy cow” for Vygotsky. Dur-
ing all three periods of his creative evolu-
tion Vygotsky had different approaches to 
what was true Marxist psychology and how 
it should be built. The fi nal formula of his 
search could be found in his own words 
that the term ‘Marxist psychology’ “co-
incided with that of scientifi c psychology 
in general, wherever and by whomsoever 
it might be developed” (Vygotsky, 1982, 
p. 435). But by the 1930s Marxism was 
increasingly seen as a sort of ‘scientifi c 
ideology’. Its leading principle was ex-
pressed not by the formula “true scientifi c 
psychology can be called Marxist psychol-
ogy”, but by “the Marxist psychology is the 
only scientifi c psychology.” The theory of 
activity (in contradistinction to Vygotsky) 
identifi ed itself as Marxist psychology. 
Any other theories (including Vygotsky’s) 
were viewed as non-scientifi c and even 
anti-scientifi c.
In any case, when uncovering the problem 
of the relation between Marxism and Vygot-
sky we must take into account the dramatic 
and even tragic character of the relation. In 
saying that “Vygotsky was more than happy 
to call himself a Marxist.” (Toulmin, 1978), 
we should also add that it was a mournful 
happiness.
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